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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050589-CA

vs.
GEORGE LEWIS ALEJANDRE,
Defendan^Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a plea and sentence for Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (West 2004), and Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's
Signal to Stop, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-209
(West Supp. 2005). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it imposed the statutory
indeterminate prison terms, as recommended by both Adult Probation and Parole
and the prosecutor?

A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v.
Helms, 2002 UT 12,11 8, 40 R3d 626. "The trial court abuses its discretion when it
fails to consider all legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the
limits prescribed by law." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,11 66, 52 P.3d 1210 (citations
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2004). Definitions - Sentences or
combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — Hearing.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of
them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (West 2004). Felony conviction - Indeterminate
term of imprisonment.
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term as follows:
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five years.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant pled guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a third degree felony, and Attempted Failure to Respond to Officer's
Signal to Stop, a class A misdemeanor. R13-14, 16-21, 38. The district court
sentenced him to zero to five years at the Utah State Prison on the felony conviction,
2

and a concurrent sentence of one year on the misdemeanor conviction. R22-23,39.
Defendant timely appealed. R25-27.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On March 22, 2005, police received a tip that defendant would be carrying
marijuana that he intended to sell. R38:4. After spotting the vehicle in which he
was a passenger, they signaled for the car to pull over. Id. Defendant told the
driver to "step on the gas" and to evade the police. Id. In the course of the chase,
defendant leapt from the car and tried to escape on foot. Id. As he fled, he dumped
nearly two kilograms of marijuana in a nearby trash can. Id. The police soon
cornered defendant and arrested him. Id. They also recovered the abandoned drugs
and noticed that its packaging was consistent with marijuana that is packaged for
sale. Id. Defendant admitted to the police that the marijuana was his and that he
was trying to evade them. Id. He also confessed that he intended to sell the
marijuana. R38:5.
Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute and attempted failure to respond to officer's signal to stop. R13-14,16-21.
After hearing and accepting his guilty plea, the court referred him to Adult
Probation and Parole (" AP&P") for a pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI"). Id.

1

Particulars of the crime are drawn solely from the prosecutor's description of
the offense at a preliminary hearing, to which defendant did not object.
3

The PSI is not in the record. 2 The record indicates, however, that defendant fell
within the probation category on the sentencing matrix. R39:2. AP&P nevertheless
recommended incarceration because of defendant's poor history in the probation
system. R39:2.
The prosecutor agreed with AP&P's recommendation. R39:3~4. In support of
his position, the prosecutor discussed defendant's 'Very lengthy involvement with
juvenile court starting in 1994 and basically running uninterrupted over the time
period that he was an adult/7 R39:3. The prosecutor asserted that"probation is a
privilege he does not take advantage of." R39:4. He continued by discussing
defendant's adult criminal career, reminding the court that the PSI described
defendant's failures in previous probation sentences: "[In] each and every one of
them, he has either failed, having to have an affidavit filed, or ultimately terminated
unsuccessfully because he hasn't taken advantage of it." Id. Further, the prosecutor
argued that all of the programs defendant was requesting had been previously
available to him in both the juvenile and adult penal systems. Id.

2

Appellant bears the burden of assuring an adequate record on appeal, and
any gaps in the record are construed in favor of the trial court's decision. See State v.
Harris, 2004 UT 103, f 46,104 P.3d 1250 ("[Wjhen an appellant fails to provide an
adequate record on appeal, we must presume that the missing portions support the
action of the district court.") (citation omitted). Thus, this Court should presume
that any information in the PSI, but not in the record, supports the trial court's
decision.
4

Defendant requested probation and enrollment in a rehabilitation program so
that "he could get that type of stability and counseling for his drug problem and see
if he [could] put his life in order/' R39:3, He notified the court that although he had
been convicted of several misdemeanor charges in the past few years, this was his
first felony. R39:2. He also informed the court that he had successfully completed
probation programs resulting from juvenile adjudications. R39:3.
The court examined the PSI and questioned defendant about whether he had
fulfilled obligations imposed by previous sentences. R39:5. Although defendant
claimed that he had paid a fine from a previous sentence, the court determined that
he had only paid a small portion of it. Id.
The court imposed a sentence of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, to
be served concurrently with a one-year sentence on the misdemeanor charge.
R39:6. The court expressed concern that defendant had not abided by the conditions
of probation previously granted by the courts and cited numerous occasions on
which defendant had failed to comply with his probation requirements. Id. It
agreed with the prosecutor that defendant had not availed himself of drug
treatment programs in the past, although they had been readily available. Id. The
court concluded that although defendant had "been given numerous opportunities
for probation

. . . [he] seemingly just [blew] them off/7

5

R39:7. The court

recommended credit for the 106 days defendant had already served. Id. Defendant
did not object to the sentence.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant did not object to his sentence, and he has not argued plain error or
exceptional circumstances. Thus his claim is unpreserved, and this Court should
not consider it.
Even if defendant had preserved his claim, it has no merit. Trial courts are
granted wide discretion when imposing a sentence within the statutory scope
provided by the legislature. Although they must consider all legally relevant
factors, they are not required to make a record of their consideration of those factors,
unless required by statute. When a court is not required to make such a record, a
reviewing court may assume that the trial court considered those factors. In such
cases, the reviewing court will overturn the sentence only if it is inherently unfair or
excessive. The trial court in this case was not required by statute to make a record of
its considerations in sentencing. Therefore, this court may assume that it considered
the legally relevant factors.

6

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT IS UNPRESERVED, AND IN ANY
EVENT, THE TRIAL DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.
A, Defendant's arguments are unpreserved.
Defendant did not make any objection or attempt to preserve his claims
below, does not cite to the record showing that this issue was preserved in the trial
court, and has not argued plain error on appeal. Thus, this Court need not address
the merits of his claim.
Generally, in criminal cases "a contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal." State v. Johnson, 774
P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989) (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546,551 (Utah 1987)). The objection below must "be specific enough to give the trial
court notice of the very error .. . complained of/7 Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water
Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App. 1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Beehive
Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859,860 (Utah 1983)). The preservation
rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT
74 / 1fll / l0P.3d346.
This Court recently held in State v. Johnson that a defendant's failure to raise a
specific objection at a sentencing hearing served as a waiver of that issue on appeal.
7

2006 UT App 3, MI14-15,2006 WL 59783. In Johnson, the defendant pled guilty to two
counts of attempted sex crimes against his granddaughters. Id. at 112. At sentencing,
the trial court asked if there were any corrections that should be made to his PSI. Id.
at 11 3. Johnson indicated that, based on his recollection of past events, there were
inconsistencies in the report and that his score should be reduced by one or two
points. Id. The court considered his argument, and received testimony from the
probation officer that the information had been taken from defendant's BCI report.
Id. The trial court ruled that because of the serious nature of the present offenses, one
or two points would not make a difference in defendant's sentence. Id. at 1f 4.
Johnson, although initially disputing the record of his 1978 conviction, "made no
objection to [the court's] finding. Instead, defense counsel thanked the court and
moved on

" Id. at 1114.

On appeal, Johnson contested the reliability of the BCI report. Id. at 11119,13.
This Court held that this issue was not preserved, and that it was precluded from
considering the merits of his argument. Id. at 111114-15. This Court noted that after
the sentencing court's "determination was made, Johnson moved on without
disputing the court's findings. . . . Johnson did not argue on appeal that the trial
court committed plain error or that the case involve[d] exceptional circumstances."
Id. at 1115. By failing to raise the issue before the sentencing judge, Johnson's actions

8

"constitute^] a waiver, precluding [this Court's] consideration of the issue on
appeal/' Id.
In this case, defendant's claims are similarly unpreserved.

Although

defendant presented mitigating factors to the court, he made neither a specific nor a
general claim of error to the court. R39:5-7. He did not then argue, as he does now,
that the court needed to consider the Galli factors in his sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at
13-15. After hearing his sentence, defendant requested that the court recommend
credit for time served, which the court granted, after which defendant merely
replied, "Thank you, your honor/' R39:7. As a result, the trial court had no notice
that defendant felt that the court's evaluation was insufficient. Because defendant
did not specifically object to the court's sentencing decision, request the court to
consider the Galli factors, or argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on
appeal, defendant has waived this issue. See Johnson, 2006 UT App 3,1115.
B. Trial courts are given broad discretion in sentencing, and there
is no evidence that the court did not consider all legally
relevant factors or imposed an inherently unfair or excessive
sentence.
Even if defendant had preserved his claim, the claim is meritless.
Defendant contends that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in this case
because it failed to consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an
excessive sentence." Aplt. Br. at 12. But he cites no cases in which a court has held

9

that a prison sentence, in lieu of probation, was "clearly excessive/7 Id. at 16.
Further, he applies case law on consecutive sentencing requirements to a claim
involving concurrent sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 13-15 (citing State v. Galli, 967 P.2d
930, 938 (Utah 1998)). Defendant's arguments lack merit.
Defendants face a particularly heavy burden when challenging a trial court's
sentence. An appeals court "will not overturn a sentence unless it exceeds statutory
or constitutional limits, the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant factors[,]
or the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of
discretion." State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, 11 3, 73 P.3d 991 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, "the fact that [a defendant] views
his situation differently than did the trial court does not prove that the trial court
neglected to consider the [legally relevant] factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1114,
40 P.3d 626. The decision to grant or deny probation "is within the complete
discretion of the trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1049 (Utah App. 1991).
In other words, "[t]he trial court has broad discretion in imposing sentence within
the statutory scope provided by the legislature." Id. at 1051.
A sentencing court is not required to state on the record its consideration of
every legally relevant factor. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 1f 11. Instead, this Court may
assume that the sentencing court considered the factors unless (1) an ambiguity of
facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly requires written
10

findings, or (3) a prior case states that findings on the issue must be made. Id. at 11
11. If a court is not required to make a record of its considerations, the sentence will
be overturned only if "it is inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Id. at 1f 14.
In this case, the sentencing court ordered a pre-sentencing investigation
report, and reviewed its contents with both parties. R38:5,39:2-7. After this review,
the court accepted the recommendations of AP&P and the prosecutor, and
sentenced defendant to the statutorily prescribed sentence: an indeterminate term of
imprisonment from zero to five years. R39:7; see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(2) &
76-3-203(3) (West 2004). No abuse of discretion occurred.
Defendant relies on State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), in arguing that the
trial court failed to consider all legally relevant factors when imposing defendant's
sentence. Aplt. Br. at 13-15. Galli was tried and convicted by three separate courts
for committing a string of armed robberies. 967 P.2d at 931-33. He was sentenced to
five years to life on each count. Id. at 932-33. On the second and third convictions,
the judges ordered that the sentence they imposed would run consecutive with his
other sentences. Id. The Utah Supreme Court upheld his convictions, but reversed
the imposition of Galli's consecutive sentences. Id. at 938-39. The court explained
that when deciding to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple
felony convictions, the trial court must consider certain mitigating factors as

11

required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 1998). Id. at 938. The record indicated
that the courts had not considered all the circumstances laid out by statute. Id.
Defendant's reliance on Galli is misplaced.

"Galli construed only the

consecutive sentencing statute—Utah Code section 76-3-401 —which requires the
trial court to consider the Defendant's rehabilitative needs and criminal history/'
State v. Olsen 2005 UT App 137, *1, 2005 WL 615120 (unpublished memorandum
decision, attached as addendum). When a defendant challenges a court's decision to
incarcerate him rather than grant probation, Galli is inapplicable. Id.
This Court should look instead to its decision in State v. Olsen. The facts of
this case are remarkably similar to those in Olsen. After a guilty plea, Olsen
contended that his sentence was excessive, although he did not argue that it
"exeed[ed] legally prescribed limits." Id. at *1 n.l. In fact, this Court noted that
during his plea, Olsen had recognized that the court could impose the statutory
sentence. Id. at *1. Olson also improperly relied on Galli, which "construed only the
consecutive sentencing statute." Id. Because his case did not involve consecutive
sentencing, but a "single indeterminate prison term of zero to five years .. . Galli
[was] inapplicable." Id. This Court also reminded Olsen that a "'defendant is not
entitled to probation.'" Id. (quoting Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051). After noting that the
trial court had the opportunity to personally observe Olsen, and was in the best

12

position to determine whether probation was more appropriate than prison time,
this Court affirmed his sentence. Id.
This case is nearly identical to Olsen. Defendant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of zero to five years, as prescribed by statute. R22-23, R39:6; see
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (West 2004). His citation to Galli is equally unavailing
because defendant did not receive consecutive felony sentences. R22-23, R39:6.
Prior to sentencing, defendant acknowledged that the court could impose "0-5 USP
[Utah State Prison]" for his crime. R16. The court examined defendant and
determined that probation was not appropriate. R39:6-7. Like Olsen, defendant
does not cite to any evidence that his sentence exceeds the legally prescribed limits.
Rather, the punishment fits the crime. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201(2) & 76-3203(3) (West 2004).
Defendant suggests that because the court did not"acknowledge or address"
certain mitigating factors when announcing its decision, it did not consider them.
Aplt. Br. at 13. However, the court is not required to make a record of each legally
relevant factor, and it is reasonable for this Court to assume that it considered them.
See Helms, 2002 UT 12, 11 11. This Court "will not assume that the trial court's
silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper factors as
required by law/7 Id. The proffer of evidence in this case is similar to that in Helms,
and "[t]he proffer of a brief sentencing order and the existence of circumstances
13

favorable to [defendant]" does not meet the burden placed upon defendant. Id. at
1116.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's sentence.
Respectfully submitted February 3,2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 1 7 2005
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20030902-CA
F I L E D
(March 1 7 , 2005)

Robert H. Olsen Jr.,
2 0 0 5 UT App

137

Defendant and Appellant.

Second District, Ogden Department
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson
Attorneys:

Dee W. Smith, Ogden, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Jackson.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Robert H. Olsen Jr. appeals his sentence after
pleading no contest to possession of methamphetamine in violation
of Utah Code section 58-37-8(2), a third degree felony. See Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (2002).
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the
trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds
legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). " ' [T]he exercise of discretion in
sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the
court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it
can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court.1" Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)).
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of zero to five
years, rather than probation, because it "failed to consider all

the legally relevant factors and imposed an excessive sentence."1
Specifically, Defendant avers that the trial court failed to
consider his rehabilitative needs and lack of criminal history.
In support of this argument, Defendant relies on State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). However, Galli construed only
the consecutive sentencing statute--Utah Code section 76-3-401-which requires the trial court to consider the Defendant's
rehabilitative needs and criminal history. See Galli, 967 P. 2d
at 938; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). The
present case does not involve consecutive sentencing. Rather,
for his felony conviction, Defendant was sentenced to a single
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years pursuant to Utah
Code section 76-3-203(3). See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3)
(2003). Thus, Galli is inapplicable.
Moreover, a "defendant is not entitled to probation, but
rather the [trial] court is empowered to place the defendant on
probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice
and is compatible with the public interest." State v. Rhodes,
818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "'The granting or
withholding of probation involves considering intangibles of
character, personality[,] and attitude, of which the cold record
gives little inkling.'" Id. at 1049 (citation omitted).
In the instant case, the trial judge had the opportunity to
personally observe Defendant. As such, the trial judge, rather
than the appellate court, was in the best position to determine
whether prison or probation was more appropriate to "serve the
ends of justice and . . . the public interest." Id. at 1051.
Furthermore, Defendant avowed, before pleading, that he
understood that the court could impose up to a maximum penalty of
zero to five years in prison. "The fact that defendant is
disappointed writh the sentence imposed does not mean it is

1. Although Defendant argues that the trial court imposed an
"excessive sentence," he does not claim that the sentence
"exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d
454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). To be clear, it does not.
Possession of methamphetamine, a Schedule II narcotic, see Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-4(b) (iii) (B) (2002), is a third degree felony.
See id. § 58-37-8(2) (b) (ii) (2002). Utah Code section 76-3-203
permits indeterminate sentencing "[i]n the case of a felony of
the third degree . . . for a term not to exceed five years." Id.
§ 76-3-203 (2003).

improper." State v. Wanlass, 953 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (per curiam).
Accordingly, Defendant's sentence is affirmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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